Lessons from the Battlefield Part Two

 

Lessons from the Battlefield Part Two

Why innovation and strategy outweigh superiority in numbers

The Battle of Gallipolli 18^th March 1915

“Opportunities multiply as they are seized,” says Sun Tzu in The Art of War (5^th Century B.C. military treatise).

The Allied forces won the First World War but they suffered reverses in many battles, too. One of these was the expedition to break through the Narrows (of the Straits of Dardanelles) leading to Gallipolli, which was ruled by the Turkish empire.

The British navy was probably the most powerful in the world at the time. They led the attack with twelve battleships, while the French contributed six. The Turks knew they were no match for the Allied forces, so they used an innovative strategy. Instead of laying a series of mines across the Straits, they sent their mine layer Nusrat on the 7^th of March to set mines parallel to the coast on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. You’ll soon see why.

#Winston Churchill was the First Lord of the Admiralty during this war.

- Along the coast, the Turks had set up shore batteries (large guns) to protect the entrance to the Dardanelles.

North Sea trawlers had been sent to try and clear the watery minefield but they were easy targets for the Turkish shore batteries and suffered major casualties.

March 18, 1915

The British and French ships sailed into the Straits in an attempt to open a way through the Narrows. They were subjected to intensive shelling and a fierce gun battle ensued between the ships and the Turkish defences lodged in forts and mobile gun batteries. The mighty ships realized they had to turn back. As they tried to manoeuvre around, however, they struck the mines laid along the shore. The French battleship Bouvet, which had been damaged by shell fire and was listing hit one of the mines and sank within thirty seconds! About six hundred men drowned.

Two British battleships, Irresistible and Ocean sank.

The rest of the Allied ships beat a hasty retreat.

                                                              The Straits of Dardenelles

The Israel-Syria War of 1973

The Battle for Golan Heights

The Golan Heights has been described as the most hotly contested real estate on the planet. I guess one could say that of the whole of Israel.

The Heights is a flat plateau stretching over 1200 sq km and it overlooks Israel. It was Syrian territory until 1967 when Israel occupied it after the Arab-Israeli Six Days’ War.

The Syrian Ploy

Syria was desperate to wrest control of the Golan Heights back from Israel and they used the Cry Wolf ploy to lull their enemy into a false state of complacency. We’ve seen how effective this is, time and time again. Remember, Sun Tzu’s famous statement: ‘All warfare is based on deception’?

- The Syrians kept mobilizing troops and then recalling them to barracks. They did this so frequently that, when they mobilized troops for a real attack in October 1973, the Israelis thought this was just another routine exercise.

- The Syrians were confident of victory because they had 1200 tanks equipped with night-fighting equipment. The Middle East terrain contains long fields of fire. There’s nowhere to hide and the Syrians considered this to be a huge advantage. If they simply rushed at the Israelis, how could the latter retaliate when they were heavily outnumbered with just 170 tanks?

The Israeli Response

Once the Israelis got over their initial shock, they gathered their defence forces with remarkable alacrity. As a small state, surrounded by hostile countries, Israel had perfected the art of mobilization.

- They had dug anti-tank trenches in front of the Golan Heights.

-Although outnumbered, the Israeli tanks were superior to the Syrians’ and could fire up to a range of 5 kms.

- Israel had worked hard to develop long range gunnery skills.

The Battle

The Syrians launched an attack by driving straight at the Israelis on the Golan Heights and soon ran into the anti-tank trenches. It made them sitting ducks for Israeli tanks on the Heights. They had to return quickly after suffering debilitating losses.

- Due to their night-fighting equipment, the Syrians launched another attack under the cover of darkness. Their Soviet-made T-55 tanks had infrared projectors which enabled them to see through the dark.

The Israelis only had night vision binoculars! (They’ve come a long way since then).

Despite this, Israel prevailed for one important reason: superior leadership and better strategy.

The Syrians kept advancing straight ahead on the long, flat terrain. The Israelis, however, kept moving about and firing, sometimes to the left, sometimes to the right. They didn’t allow their tanks to become easy targets and managed to pound the Syrian tanks into submission!

It’s a testament to their success that even today, the Golan Heights remains in Israeli possession.

Lessons from the Battlefront Part One

 

                                                The First Battle of Panipat 1526

Lessons from the Battlefront Part One

Why innovation and strategy outweigh superiority in numbers

Part One: The First Battle of Panipat (April 1526)

Part Two: The Battle of Gallipolli (March 1915) and

The Israel-Syria War (October 1973)

 

History teaches us that the numerical strength of an army is no guarantee of success on the battlefield. The examples are many. I’m using the accounts of three battles mentioned above to illustrate this. So, let’s get into it.

“All warfare is based on deception,” says Sun Tzu in the celebrated 5^th Century B.C. Chinese military treatise, The Art of War, “Hence, when we are able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must appear inactive…”

Each of these three examples proves this. 

The First Battle of Panipat 21^st April, 1526

Babur Vs Ibrahim Lodi

Background

The Lodi dynasty was on the throne at Delhi, headed by Ibrahim Lodi. A clash between Ibrahim Lodi and the Governor of Lahore, Daulat Khan Lodi resulted in Daulat Khan inviting a Mongol prince to invade India. This prince, Babur, had made Kabul his base (in 1504) after struggling to control his ancestral kingdom Fargana. Babur took over Lahore in 1524 and then returned to Kabul to plan his strategy for defeating the Lodi emperor. He crossed the Indus in December 1525 with a force of just 12000 (according to his memoirs, the Baburnama).

The Battlelines

Ibrahim Lodi’s army numbered about one lakh, which was huge in those days. But it suffered from some disadvantages, which proved fatal.

i) It was not a standing army. Rather, it was a force that had been gathered from different parts of the empire. The soldiers had never fought together.

ii) It had a large contingent of elephants which, for obvious reasons, marched slowly.

iii) Lodi was overconfident. He’d heard about the small numbers of Babur’s army and must’ve thought the Mongol would be crushed easily.

In contrast, Babur was fully aware of his numerical disadvantage and used brilliant strategies to overcome this.

i) Unlike previous invaders, Babur did not rape and pillage the populace. He’d come to India with the aim of establishing an empire and did not want to alienate the people. It is said he took care of widows and orphans in the areas he conquered. As he entered through Ropar and Ambala, he bought about 700 bullock-carts from villagers. Bought, not grabbed. Will tell you why he needed them shortly.

ii) Babur convinced the powerful Janjua Rajputs to join his campaign. They were bitterly opposed to the Delhi throne and seized their chance to overthrow Ibrahim Lodi. With their assistance, Babur’s army swelled to about 25000. It was still one-fourth of the size of Lodi’s but better than 12000. Besides, the Rajputs were brave warriors and that was a big plus for Babur.

iii) This battle saw the use of cannons for the first time in India. Lodi’s army had no cannons.

iv) Babur had a contingent of expert mounted archers, which proved more effective than sword or spear-wielding cavalry.

v) Babur’s artillery included matchlock rifles, which were a rarity in those days.

vi) Babur’s own contingent of 12000 was battle-hardened and fiercely loyal to him. They’d fought together in about eight or ten campaigns and one can imagine the camaraderie amongst them.

Despite these advantages, Babur knew that his choice of battle venue- the field of Panipat- would give a large army the upper hand. So, he had to come up with some solutions fast.

After reaching Panipat on the first of April, he quickly chose the best possible position. Keeping Panipat city on his right, he had a seven-kilometer long trench dug up to the Yamuna river on the opposite side. This was filled with wooden spikes and covered with earth and leaves, etc. to conceal it. Behind them, he made a row of the bullock-carts bound together with rawhide. There were gaps of ten to fifteen feet between them at various points, where he placed his archers and artillery. His cavalry, too, could charge through these gaps.

Behind the first few rows of infantry soldiers, Babur himself led the main position called Kul. He was flanked by a contingent on the left led by his trusted General Mohammed Mirza and another to his right led by his son and successor Prince Humayun. His heavy cavalry contingent was led by another war veteran called Iltmish.

The Battle

Babur’s scouts informed him about the progress of Lodi’s army. It was a large, unwieldy force that marched slowly. They covered only four miles per day, while travelling to Panipat!

To precipitate matters, Babur sent a large force of about four thousand men to raid the Lodi camp on the 19^th of April. The raid was repelled by Lodi’s Afghan guards and Babur lost a number of men. This early victory lulled the Lodi army into a false sense of complacency. They became confident of a quick triumph in battle and attacked Babur’s army two days later.

Lodi sent his 300 strong elephants contingent first. Babur waited for them to come perilously close and then fired a barrage of artillery and cannons. The cannons might’ve missed their targets since their range was short but the mere sound confused and frightened the elephants, who panicked and trampled their own army. Lodi’s infantry met a similar fate when they fell into the trench in front of the bullock carts. Babur then deployed his heavy cavalry to cut off the Lodi army from both sides.

#Babur wanted Lodi to attack first so that the latter's army could be cut down in the trenches and confused with the cannon fire! That's why he'd sent an advance raiding party to the Lodi camp.

The battle lasted six hours. Lodi died on the field. They say he showed exemplary valour, refusing to flee even when his army was being routed. Babur went up to Lodi’s body and said: “I salute your bravery.” But the rest of Lodi’s army, comprising about twenty-five thousand, met a cruel fate. Babur had them all beheaded. 25000 men! Just think. Gross! And in a grisly message to his future enemies, he made a mound of their heads.

A rather common practice in those days. Queen Elizabeth I put her enemies' heads (particularly those who rebelled against her) on spikes at public spots so that everyone could see them! 

Anyhow, after his quick victory at Panipat, Babur marched on Delhi.

And, thus, began the rule of the Mughal dynasty in India.

 

Babur built this mosque at Panipat in 1527 to commemorate his victory. It still stands today.